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CRAFTING A CORPORATE ANALOGUE TO 
CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
B. Graves Lee, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC 
represented a sea change in the world of corporate citizenship.  Although the 
decision dealt with campaign finance law, it has sparked significant discussion 
of the concept of corporate personhood more broadly.  Corporations have 
increasingly taken advantage of legal rights previously reserved for 
individuals.  This Note argues that where corporations reap the benefits of 
constitutional entitlements intended for individuals, they should suffer 
consequences for malfeasance similar to those imposed on individuals who 
engage in criminal conduct.  Specifically, this Note advocates for limitations 
on corporate electioneering as a collateral consequence of a corporation’s 
criminal conviction, just as individuals may forfeit the right to vote following a 
felony conviction.  Such a reform would address common criticisms regarding 
corporate criminal prosecutions’ lack of deterrent effect.  It would also send 
an important expressive message that corporations do not enjoy more 
favorable treatment than individuals when facing criminal prosecutions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 382
I. WHY AND HOW WE PROSECUTE CORPORATIONS:
HISTORY, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND CRITICISM ............................... 383
A. Theories of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions ................... 383
B. Collateral Consequences for Criminal Convictions........... 386
II. ELECTIONEERING LIMITS AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD......... 388
A. The Road to Citizens United and Money as Speech........... 388
B. The Citizens United Decision............................................. 390
C. Fallout of Citizens United and Emerging Conceptions of 
Corporate Personhood....................................................... 392
III. CRAFTING A CORPORATE ANALOGUE TO  
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT ......................... 395
A. Substance and Mechanics of Corporate 
Disenfranchisement............................................................ 395
B. Benefits of Corporate Criminal Disenfranchisement ......... 396
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Profes-
sors Vic Khanna, David Uhlmann, and Ellen Katz for their insights and suggestions. Thanks also to 
Johannah Walker and Allison Lasher for excellent feedback on earlier drafts, and to the staff of the 
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review for their help through the publication process.
381
382 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 8:381




“Corporations are people, my friend,” responded former Republican presi-
dential nominee Mitt Romney to a protestor’s shouts at a 2011 campaign event.1
In a way, this was an uncontroversial statement.  After all, corporations have 
long enjoyed the legal status of personhood.  However, the twenty-first century 
has seen the notion of the corporation as a person aggressively advanced in new 
directions.
Perhaps no single instance has done more to ingrain corporate personhood 
in the popular conscience than the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
v. FEC.2  The Court struck down statutory limits on corporate electioneering 
contributions on First Amendment grounds.  In doing so, the Court sparked sig-
nificant outcry and attracted criticism for facilitating the ability of corporations 
to assert rights traditionally thought to be reserved for individuals.  Since Citi-
zens United, there have been numerous instances of corporations claiming rights 
ostensibly meant for individuals in other contexts as well.3
However, if corporations may reap the benefits of constitutional protections 
for individuals, should they not also be subject to analogous consequences?  
This Note proposes that, in the context of corporate crime, the answer is yes.  
Specifically, the Note will argue that corporations convicted of a crime should 
face limitations on political activity akin to individual felony disenfranchise-
ment.  The proposed reform would also force corporations to disclose election-
eering information that would otherwise be discretionary to disclose.  Corporate 
criminal disenfranchisement would shore up the deterrent effect of corporate 
prosecutions, addressing a common critique of such prosecutions.  It would also 
serve an expressive function, indicating that corporations may not opt into a dif-
ferent set of rules than individuals are subject to when facing criminal prosecu-
tion.  Corporate criminal disenfranchisement may also be constructed in a way 
that is consonant with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
post-Citizens United.
Part I of this Note first examines the underpinnings of corporate crime to 
describe why society prosecutes corporations directly, as well as prominent crit-
icisms of corporate criminal prosecutions.  Part I also describes the historical 
and constitutional status of collateral consequences of criminal convictions, 
both for corporations and individuals.  Part II discusses regulations of corporate 
campaign finance before and after Citizens United before moving into a broader 
1. Ashley Parker, ‘Corporations Are People,’ Romney Tells Iowa Hecklers Angry Over 
His Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/politics/
12romney.html.
2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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discussion of the notion of corporate personhood.  Part III lays out the proposed 
reform—restrictions on electioneering flowing from a corporation’s criminal 
conviction—before addressing counterarguments.
I. WHY AND HOW WE PROSECUTE CORPORATIONS:
HISTORY, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND CRITICISM
A. Theories of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions
The ability to bring criminal charges against a corporation directly, as op-
posed to the individuals making up the corporation, is a well-established tool 
available to prosecutors in the United States.4 Prosecutors have used this tool 
for over a century, and the United States Supreme Court held the practice con-
stitutional in 1909.5 The doctrine arose as the corporate form became common 
in American society.6 Although prosecutors’ use of criminal corporate prosecu-
tions has waxed and waned over time,7 it remains a valid tactic for addressing 
corporate wrongdoing.
A corporation may be criminally liable for acts of its employees or agents 
committed within the scope of their employment or agency for the benefit of the 
corporation.8 When deciding whether the corporation had the requisite mental 
state to incur criminal liability, the court will look to the mental state of the cor-
porate employees or agents involved and impute that state to the corporation 
itself.9 Even when no individual employee or agent possesses the requisite 
mental state, the court may consider employees’ or agents’ collective 
knowledge to satisfy the mens rea requirement.10 This criminal liability arises 
separately from the corporation’s civil liability for the same act or acts and does 
not preclude civil or administrative enforcement actions for the same acts.11
As in the individual criminal context, the prosecution of corporations ad-
vances several societal goals.  First, prosecutions deter. Ideally, they dissuade 
other corporations from engaging in similar wrongdoing in the future.12 Mone-
4. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 
(1996) (providing an overview of the doctrine surrounding corporate crime).
5. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (re-
jecting the argument that a corporation cannot be held criminally liable).
6. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1482 (1996).
7. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal 
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2016) [hereinafter Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings]
(discussing the shift from corporate criminal prosecutions to deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations).
8. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 494.
9. See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
10. Id.
11. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 321.
12. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1495.
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tary penalties may steer prospective corporate wrongdoers away from the temp-
tation to break the law.  Courts may also require structural reforms within a cor-
poration following a criminal conviction.13 This too can add deterrent bite.14
Although the same financial and structural consequences can flow from civ-
il or administrative enforcement actions,15 some argue that the badge of a crim-
inal conviction provides a deterrent effect that those procedures lack.16 The la-
bel of criminality brings with it a public stigma for management that mere civil 
or administrative liability does not.17 This stigma may nudge corporations away 
from courses of conduct that could bring corporate liability.18 This expressive 
mechanism of societal disapproval is similar to that of individual criminal pros-
ecution, placing moral blame upon the bad actor.19
This stigma also serves a retributive purpose, punishing the corporation for 
wrongdoing.20 However, many scholars are skeptical of the retributive justifi-
cations of corporate criminal prosecutions.  Retributive theories of criminal jus-
tice presuppose a level of moral culpability as a justification for imposing pun-
ishment.21 But because corporations are typically a collective body, pinpointing 
the “mind” of a corporation in an effort to identify mens rea presents challenges 
that do not arise in the prosecution of individuals.22
Others point to decision-making mechanisms within the corporate structure 
to argue that retributive goals are coherent with corporate punishment.23  Be-
cause corporate decision making is the result of intentional choices that carry a 
moral element, a mental state for any given decision can be imputed to a corpo-
ration.24 The moral, ethical, and social guidelines to which corporations adhere 
13. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1240–41.
14. Id. But see Khanna, supra note 6, at 1534 (expressing doubt about such deterrent value).
15. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1240–41.
16. Id. at 1242 (“[T]here is additional deterrent value associated with criminal charges 
against corporations. Companies do not want to be labeled corporate criminals and therefore may 
have more incentives to avoid criminal sanctions than otherwise comparable civil or administrative 
sanctions.” (footnote omitted)).
17. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1509 (“[T]here is no [reputational] rub-off effect if the cor-
poration is found liable in civil court because civil cases are such common occurrences.”).
18. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1242.
19. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 500–03 (2006).
20. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 852–53 (2000).
21. See John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 583 (1982).
22. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 320 (“Corporations are legal fictions, and legal 
fictions cannot commit criminal acts. Nor can they possess mens rea . . . .”); Howard M. Friedman, 
Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 180 
(1979).
23. See, e.g., Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1248–50.
24. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 279, 
281–82 (2006).
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in making a given decision can all provide evidence for the level of moral cul-
pability in that decision.25
Certain collateral consequences can flow from a corporation’s criminal 
conviction that are not available sanctions in the realm of civil liability.  Per-
haps the most consequential26 is debarment of government contractors from fu-
ture contracting with the federal government.27 Corporations may also be sub-
ject to loss of license to engage in certain activities.28 This loss of license, 
foreign to the civil and administrative sphere, suggests that novel collateral con-
sequences may add further deterrent value.
Still, some commentators question how much deterrence corporate criminal 
prosecution really affords.29 Crucially, a corporation cannot be put in jail, un-
like individuals.30 The possibility of incarceration is one of the biggest reasons 
not to engage in criminal activity.  Yet this threat is entirely absent from the 
corporation’s decision-making processes.  In short, the argument goes, corpora-
tions simply do not care about criminal prosecutions in the same way that indi-
viduals do because of the impossibility of incarceration of the corporation itself.
Scholarship is divided on this point.  On the one hand, the impact of reputa-
tional sanctions is speculative, and the impact of these sanctions lacks uniformi-
ty.31 However, evidence indicates that reputational harms flowing from corpo-
rate criminal convictions can give rise to consequences heightened in or unique 
to the criminal context.32  These include disruption in customer relationships, 
managerial and employee turnover, and cost outlays to prevent further commis-
sions of similar crimes.33
25. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1249.
26. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1335 (2013) [hereinafter Uhlmann, 
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements].
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2018) (instituting debarment as a sanction for criminal convic-
tion under the Clean Water Act); see also RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND 
SENTENCING § 1.9.2(c) (1994) (estimating that debarments and license suspensions were imposed 
as a collateral consequence in twenty-five percent of government procurement cases and twenty 
percent of government program fraud cases).
28. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1497–99.
29. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corpora-
tions, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359 (2009) (discussing the improper deterrent effect falling upon 
shareholders who do not engage in the decision-making that could give rise to criminal liability); 
Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 324 (arguing through an economic framework that corporate crim-
inal liability may create problems both of under- and over-deterrence); Khanna, supra note 6, at 
1493–96.
30. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 322 (“Of course, corporations may . . . lack the 
resources to pay monetary penalties against them, but the alternative of incarceration is not available 
for them.”).
31. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1504–05 (“The use of reputation is nonetheless problemat-
ic, because reputational sanctions are inaccurate and affect only firms with good reputations.”).
32. See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate 
Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 523 (1999).
33. Id.
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Finally, corporate criminal prosecutions can serve the purpose of promoting 
the perception of fairness throughout the criminal justice system.  In high-
profile instances of corporate misconduct, public outcry has emerged when the 
state declines to prosecute.34 Uniform treatment of corporate and individual 
criminal defendants bolsters the public’s perception of fairness within the crim-
inal justice system.35
This Note addresses the perceived shortcomings of criminal corporate pros-
ecutions by adding a new collateral consequence to convictions: restrictions on 
the corporate defendant’s ability to engage in electioneering.  This policy re-
form would enhance the deterrent effect of corporate criminal prosecutions.  
Likewise, it would engender feelings of fairness by creating a step towards 
similar treatment of individual and corporate defendants in the criminal sphere.
B. Collateral Consequences for Criminal Convictions
For individuals, the criminal justice system has deterrent features beyond 
the possibility of incarceration.  Individuals routinely suffer collateral conse-
quences even after they serve their sentences.  For example, people convicted of 
a crime36 may face deportation post-conviction.37 They may be forbidden from 
owning a firearm.38 They may be subject to no-contact orders.39 They may 
lose eligibility to receive government benefits.40
34. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265 
(2014) (discussing anger at the lack of prosecutions following the 2008 financial collapse); Jed S. 
Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-
executive-prosecutions/.
35. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1268 (“We expect corporations to 
meet their legal obligations, just as we expect individuals to do so; we must sanction corporate crim-
inality just as we must sanction individual criminality.”).
36. Although the historical tendency has been to refer to such individuals with terms such as 
“convict,” “felon,” or “offender,” this Note will eschew such terminology in an effort to keep to the 
contemporary practice avoiding branding these individuals with a stigmatic badge. See generally
Karol Mason, Justice Dept. Agency to Alter its Terminology for Released Convicts, to Ease Reentry,
WASH. POST (May 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/05/04/
guest-post-justice-dept-to-alter-its-terminology-for-released-convicts-to-ease-reentry (describing a 
Department of Justice policy shift in this direction).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2018) (rendering deportable any alien convicted of certain 
crimes).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (criminalizing the possession of firearms and ammunition for 
individuals “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year”).
39. See, e.g., Jones v. Alabama, No. 14-0059-WS-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88245 (S.D. 
Ala. June 30, 2015); State v. Latham, Nos. A11-1930 and A11-1931, 2014 Minn. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1204 (Nov. 24, 2014); Thatcher v. Thatcher, No. 22493-7-III, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 
2361 (Oct. 19, 2004).
40. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Crim-
inal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 259 (2002).
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Perhaps the most severe collateral consequence for individuals who have 
been convicted of a crime is the loss of voting rights.  An overwhelming majori-
ty of states disenfranchise those convicted of a felony.41 Prior felony convic-
tions bar millions of Americans from voting—a 2016 study estimated the num-
ber to be about one in every forty adults in America, with the rate for African 
Americans of voting age over four times higher.42  Although criminal justice 
reformers have fueled a movement to open avenues to restoration of voting 
rights for convicted felons in many states,43 the forfeiture of voting rights upon 
conviction of a felony remains the norm for individuals all over in the United 
States.44
The legal justification for collateral consequences stems from the common 
law.45 In the English tradition, people suffered profound consequences follow-
ing a criminal conviction.  A conviction could trigger the forfeiture of rights 
that are now thought to be fundamental, including the right to contract, marry, 
and bring suit.46  Post-conviction punishment was so harsh that it came to be 
known as a “civil death.”47 Although the American criminal justice system has 
taken a step back from these severe common law traditions, it nonetheless im-
41. See Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT (July 17, 
2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/. Note 
that that these numbers were compiled before the recent passage of Amendment 4, a ballot measure 
in Florida that could restore voting rights for over one million people with felony convictions. 
Nadege Green, Florida Passes Amendment 4, Will Automatically Restore Right to Vote for Felons,
WLRN (Nov. 6, 2018), http://www.wlrn.org/post/florida-passes-amendment-4-will-automatically-
restore-right-vote-felons. Currently, however, the number of people who will reobtain their voting 
rights under Amendment 4 is unclear. See Karen Zraick, Florida Republicans Push to Make Ex-
Felons Pay Fees Before They Can Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/20/us/florida-felon-voting-rights.html (describing the political fight over a Republican-
sponsored bill in the Florida legislature that would curtail the impact of Amendment 4).
42. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS:
STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016 (2016), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-
disenfranchisement-2016/. These numbers were also compiled before the passage of Amendment 4 
in Florida. See Green, supra note 41.
43. Restoring the Right to Vote by State, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/restoring-right-vote-state (“Since 1997, twenty-three states 
have made legislative or policy changes restoring the vote to at least some people with criminal 
convictions or liberalizing the state’s clemency procedures.”). This was published prior to the pas-
sage of Amendment 4 in Florida, which represented a monumental development in the political 
movement against felony disenfranchisement. See Green, supra note 41. However, the practice is 
still commonplace elsewhere in the United States.
44. Chung, supra note 41, at 2 fig.A.
45. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues 
of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 478 (2010).
46. See id.; Alec C. Ewald, Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1049 n.13.
47. Pinard, supra note 45, at 478.
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poses a number of collateral consequences that are arguably more punitive than 
incarceration.48
Collateral consequences from felony disenfranchisement to risk of deporta-
tion to loss of access to public benefits have all attracted considerable reasoned 
critiques from commentators.49 This Note does not endorse imposing these 
consequences on individuals convicted of crimes.  Nor does it take umbrage 
with the moral, racial, sociological, and philosophical objections within these 
critiques to the extent that they impact individuals differently than they do cor-
porations.  Instead, this Note argues that where a stringent system of collateral 
consequences exists for individuals, it should be applied equitably to corpora-
tions convicted of criminal misconduct.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,50 the 
notion of corporate personhood entered the popular conscience.  Drawing upon 
this idea, this Note argues that limits on corporate political activity following a 
criminal conviction in the same way we restrict the political activity of those 
convicted of a felony could address some of the shortfalls in election law that 
critics of Citizens United have focused upon.  These limits would better tailor 
punishments towards deterrent goals and would combat popular perceptions that 
corporations are subject to a different system of justice than are individuals.
II. ELECTIONEERING LIMITS AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
A. The Road to Citizens United and Money as Speech
Modern limits to electioneering find their genesis in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Buckley v. Valeo.51 Buckley presented a broad challenge to the 1971 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which included provisions capping 
individual donations to campaigns52 and banning corporate and union contribu-
tions outright.53 Those challenging the law argued that regulating electioneer-
ing activity amounted to a regulation of political speech.  Therefore, the law 
48. See Chin, supra note 40, at 253 (“[C]ollateral consequences may be the most significant 
penalties resulting from a criminal conviction.”); Colleen F. Shanahan, Significant Entanglements: 
A Framework for the Civil Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387,
1394 (2012).
49. See generally Chin, supra note 40 (investigating the “covert” nature of these conse-
quences’ impact); Pinard, supra note 45 (discussing the disproportionate racial impact of collateral 
consequences on individuals convicted of a crime).
50. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
52. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, partially invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
53. FECA § 610, invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
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needed to meet the exacting standards of strict scrutiny54 to avoid violation of 
the First Amendment.55
The Court, in a 170-page per curiam opinion, upheld some parts of the law 
and struck down others.56 Perhaps most crucial, however, was the Court’s ac-
ceptance of the challengers’ argument that regulation of campaign contributions 
implicated the First Amendment.57 Because the Court found that political con-
tributions facilitated political speech, contribution limits restricted political 
speech itself.58 Buckley opened the door for future challenges to campaign fi-
nance laws on First Amendment grounds. Dissenting in part, Justice White 
made explicit the paradigm shift that the majority left unsaid: “money is 
speech.”59
Twenty-six years later, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act, commonly referred to as McCain-Feingold, enacting new restrictions on 
campaign contributions.60 In a five-to-four victory before the Supreme Court, 
most of McCain-Feingold survived a 2003 facial challenge.61 The justice who 
provided the swing vote, Justice O’Connor, retired three years later.62 Soon af-
ter, her replacement, Justice Alito, swung the Court’s majority view on cam-
paign finance.  In 2007, one of McCain-Feingold’s key provisions lost in an as-
applied challenge before the Supreme Court.63 The Court, however, could not
muster up a majority to declare the provision facially unconstitutional, so they 
stopped short of overturning the 2003 decision.64
54. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (“The Equal Protection Clause re-
quires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate ob-
jectives.”).
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11 (“In appellants’ view, limiting the use of money for political 
purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtual-
ly all meaningful political communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of mon-
ey.”).
56. Id. at 143.
57. Stuart McPhail, Remembering Buckley’s Mistakes, CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN 
WASHINGTON (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.citizensforethics.org/remembering-buckleys-mistakes/.
58. See Eugene Volokh, Money and Speech, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 24, 2010), 
http://volokh.com/2010/01/24/money-and-speech-2/.
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81.
61. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). One provision of McCain-Feingold that the 
Court upheld banned corporations from use of general treasury accounts to fund television and radio 
ads during election season that urged viewers to vote for or oppose a candidate. The Court relied on 
its ruling in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), in which it upheld the 
constitutionality of a state law prohibition against corporations’ use of general treasury funds for 
donations to campaigns for elected state office. 
62. See Sandra Day O’Connor, First Woman on the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/SandraDayOConnor.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2018).
63. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
64. Id. at 482 (“McConnell held that express advocacy of a candidate or his opponent by a 
corporation shortly before an election may be prohibited, along with the functional equivalent of 
such express advocacy. We have no occasion to revisit that determination today.”).
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B. The Citizens United Decision
When the Supreme Court first heard oral argument in Citizens United in 
2009, the case presented an issue of campaign finance law that seemed unlikely 
to have profound constitutional repercussions.65 Counsel for the petitioners ar-
gued that Section 203 of McCain-Feingold, which prohibited corporations from 
spending money from their general treasuries on electioneering, did not apply to 
the commission of a politically-charged documentary.  They pushed the Court 
to resolve the case on purely statutory grounds, obviating the need to consider 
the broader constitutionality of the law.66 However, after an unexpected turn at 
argument, the conservative wing of the Court signaled its openness to a consti-
tutional attack on the law.67  The Court set the case for rehearing, requesting 
supplemental briefing on whether the Court’s prior decision regarding the con-
stitutionality of corporate contribution limits should be overruled.68
The Court agreed that corporations enjoy full First Amendment protections 
in the realm of political speech.69 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion leaned on 
First Amendment precedent indicating that the government cannot determine 
what speech is protected based on the identity of the speaker70 to hold that the 
very same protection applies to corporations.71 The opinion echoed worries 
voiced by Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Roberts in the first round of oral argu-
ment that allowing regulation of political speech could lead to an endpoint 
where the government has an ability to censor the press, print media, and other 
commonplace forms of communication.72 The Court invalidated Section 203 of 
McCain-Feingold outright, invalidated 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s ban on the use of cor-
porate treasury funds for express advocacy, and overturned McConnell v. 
FEC—the case that had upheld Section 203’s constitutionality just seven years 
before.73
65. See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated 
the Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER: ANNALS OF LAW (May 21, 2012), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited.
66. Id. (“[Citizens United’s counsel Theodore] Olson’s argument indicated that there was no 
need for the Court to declare any part of the law unconstitutional, or even to address the First 
Amendment implications of the case.”).
67. See id.
68. Lyle Denniston, Briefing Set on Citizens United Rehearing, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 
2009, 2:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/06/briefing-set-on-citizens-united-rehear/.
69. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
70. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); First Nat’l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
71. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342.
72. See id. at 337.
73. Id. at 365–66 (“Austin is overruled . . . . The McConnell court relied on the antidistortion 
interest recognized in Austin to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in 
Austin . . . . This part of McConnell is now overruled.”) (internal citations omitted).
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On the other hand, Section 311 of McCain-Feingold survived Citizens Unit-
ed.74 This provision contained the statute’s disclosure requirements for corpo-
rate political spending.  It mandated that any non-candidate entity who funds a 
televised electioneering communication must include a disclaimer identifying 
the source of the funding.75 The Court explained that disclosure requirements 
do not prevent speech itself, and that the government had an interest in aiding 
citizens in making informed choices in elections.76 The Court also upheld 
McCain-Feingold Section 201, which requires that large-money donors file a 
disclosure statement with the FEC,77 on similar grounds as McCain-Feingold 
Section 311.78
Some criticism of the Citizens United decision has focused on its treatment 
of disclosure law.  On the one hand, the decision ostensibly left undisturbed the 
state of disclosure law by leaving the pertinent provisions of McCain-Feingold 
intact.79 However, the majority failed to address the FEC’s continued narrow-
ing of what types of transactions are subject to disclosure.80 As a result, only 
those contributions specifically earmarked for election spending trigger disclo-
sure requirements.81 When Citizens United removed the shackles from the ac-
tivities of SuperPACs, it opened the door to largescale donations to these 
groups.  Disclosure of these donations was not required by law unless given 
with a specific directive to spend on an election.82 Some commentators have 
posited that many of the decision’s ill effects could be ameliorated through 
heightening of the FEC’s interpretations of disclosure requirements.83 Howev-
er, partisan polarization among the six politically appointed Commissioners 
seems to have sapped the political will necessary to create this change at the 
FEC.84
74. See id. at 367.
75. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2)).
76. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67.
77. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)).
78. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Symposium, The Disclosure Debates: The Regulatory Power of an Informed 
Public, 38 VT. L. REV. 933, 937 (2013) [hereinafter Malloy] (statement by Tara Malloy, Senior 
Counsel, Campaign Legal Center, criticizing this aspect of the Citizens United opinion).
81. See id.
82. See id. (“For example, if I were to give $100,000 to [a SuperPAC], and not earmark the 
funds for anything, I [sic] would not have to be disclosed . . . as long as I was not foolish or honest 
enough to say, ‘Please use my millions of dollars for an election ad that falls into the two legal cate-
gories.’ ”).
83. See, e.g., Citizens United, RADIOLAB PRESENTS MORE PERFECT (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/citizens-united/ (pertinent discussion from 53:56–56:33).
84. See id. (pertinent discussion from 56:34–1:00:24).
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C. Fallout of Citizens United and
Emerging Conceptions of Corporate Personhood
The Citizens United decision’s apparent treatment of the corporate form as a 
legal person sparked widespread outcry.85 The majority opinion carefully 
stopped short of explicitly equating corporations and persons, often echoing 
Section 441b’s language of “persons or group.”86 Still, the Court placed indi-
viduals and corporations on equal footing when engaging in political speech.87
This prompted populist pushback.  Taken alongside Republican presidential
nominee Mitt Romney’s infamous assertion that “corporations are people, my 
friend,” the case drew major attention during the 2012 presidential election cy-
cle.88 Scrutiny of the decision continues today.89
Significant cracks in the armor of legal restrictions on corporate giving have 
emerged as a consequence of Citizens United.  The D.C. Circuit relied on Citi-
zens United to invalidate caps on corporations’ donations to SuperPACs.90 The 
decision had major impacts on the 2012 presidential election, where large do-
nors played key roles in bolstering candidates’ war chests.91 The Supreme 
Court has also invalidated attempts to use public funding to offset the advantage 
of candidates who enjoy major financial support from large private donors.92
Citizens United also left open questions about how far the comparison be-
tween the corporate entity and human persons might go.  The majority opinion 
85. See, e.g., Amanda D. Johnson, Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of Corpo-
rate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187, 187 (2010); Jim Hightower, Fighting the Subversion of 
Our People’s Sovereignty, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 26, 2010), http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/
item/88240:fighting-the-subversion-of-our-peoples-sovereignty.
86. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339, 366, 368 (2010). The dissenting justices ex-
plicitly use the term “personhood” in describing the majority’s conception of a corporation’s ability 
to exercise free speech rights. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 343 (“Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks 
to foster. The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment.”) (majority opinion) (internal 
citations omitted).
88. See, e.g., Justin Elliott, Why Mitt Romney Was Right about Corporations, SALON (Aug. 
13, 2011, 6:01 PM), https://www.salon.com/2011/08/13/corporate_personhood/; John Light, Where 
do the Candidates Stand on Citizens United?, MOYERS & COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://billmoyers.com/2012/10/19/where-do-the-candidates-stand-on-citizens-united/.
89. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act Like It,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corporations-are-
people-they-should-act-like-it/385034/; Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? 
Excavating the Legal Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/
when-did-companies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution.
90. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
91. Toobin, supra note 65 (“Sheldon Adelson, the gambling entrepreneur, gave about fifteen 
million dollars to support Newt Gingrich, and Foster Friess, a Wyoming financier, donated almost 
two million dollars to Rick Santorum’s Super PAC. Karl Rove organized a Super PAC that has 
raised about thirty million dollars in the past several months for use in support of Republicans.”).
92. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2011).
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gave little guidance as to what rights corporations might enjoy under a person-
hood theory outside of the context of campaign contributions.93 In its after-
math, some worried that the case might provide ammunition for overruling the 
ban on direct corporate donations to political candidates (as opposed to funding 
electioneering communications, which was at issue in Citizens United).94  To 
date, this has not occurred—at least one district court has explicitly declined to 
extend the rule of Citizens United to invalidate the ban on direct corporate elec-
toral donations,95 and another district court that relied on Citizens United to in-
validate the ban was reversed on appeal.96 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that Citizens United does not alter the propriety of limiting corporate 
electioneering when the purpose behind such regulation is to prevent corruption 
or the appearance thereof.97
What’s more, Citizens United could lay the foundation for corporations to 
assert new rights divorced from the campaign finance context.  Commentary on 
this possibility has ensued since the ruling in Citizens United.98 And in 2014, 
the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the possibility in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.  There, the Court held that the Affordable Care Act could not 
require Hobby Lobby to provide health plans that covered contraception be-
cause it impermissibly burdened the corporation’s religious freedom.99
This attempt to expand corporate personhood likewise reaches the criminal 
context.100 In 2015, the Third Circuit rejected a claim that a corporation was 
93. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD 
ACT LIKE IT) 60 (Yale Univ. Press 2018) (“The Citizens United opinion . . . does not reveal deep 
thought about when corporations should have rights.”).
94. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate 
Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 577–78 n.3 (2012) (“Citizens United may well prompt recogni-
tion of even broader corporate political rights.”).
95. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1133 (D. 
Minn. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
96. United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 493–94 (E.D. Va. 2011) (relying on 
Citizens United to invalidate Section 441b(a) of FECA), rev’d, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).
97. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014) (“This Court has identified only one le-
gitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption.”). In this analysis the Court leans heavily on the analysis in Davis v. FEC,
554 U.S. 724 (2008).
98. See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 94, at 577–78 n.3; Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humaniza-
tion of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citi-
zens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 40 (2010).
99. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 682 (2014). Although the Hobby 
Lobby majority did not directly cite Citizens United, each case deals with the ability of a corporation 
to assert constitutional rights in novel ways. Numerous commentators have compared the two in 
significant detail. See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corpora-
tions, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 96–104 (2014); David Rosenberg, The Corporate Paradox of Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 308 (2016); Ryan Azad, Comment, Can a 
Tailor Mend the Analytical Hole? A Framework for Understanding Corporate Constitutional 
Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 452, 452–67 (2017).
100. The phenomenon of corporations asserting constitutional rights meant to constrain the 
activities of law enforcement is not entirely new. For instance, the Supreme Court held nearly a cen-
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entitled to a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before a 
grand jury subpoena.101  This attempt found its grounding partially in the ex-
panded corporate rights granted by the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby deci-
sions.102 A number of circuits ruled prior to Citizens United that a corporation 
may have a Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceed-
ings, but the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.103
Other commentators have suggested that the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment might give rise to another extension of 
corporate rights.  One conception of the Fourth Amendment is protection 
against intrusions on activities associated with freedom of thought.104 Coupled 
with the language in Citizens United about the right of corporations to engage in 
the “marketplace of ideas,”105 the possibility of increased corporate Fourth 
Amendment protections may be viable.106 Remarkably, one scholar has assert-
ed that the case law granting corporations constitutional rights like those of in-
dividuals would not be inconsistent with a corporation asserting a Second 
Amendment right to take up arms.107
Beyond the effects that Citizens United has had on the constitutional rights 
of corporations outside of the context of election law, there may be subtle ef-
fects in doctrine that alter the course of corporate criminal prosecutions.  In the 
tury ago that corporations enjoy at least some protections against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures under the Fourth Amendment. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
(1920) (“[T]he rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected . . . .”). 
Still, assertions of novel conceptions of corporate rights may be accelerating in the wake of Citizens 
United, as this discussion details. And, scholars and commentators have looked to corporate person-
hood jurisprudence following Citizens United in imagining how those rights may change going for-
ward. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 93, at 74–81 (discussing the history and trajectory of cor-
porate criminal procedure rights).
101. In re Grand Jury Empaneled on May 9, 2014, 786 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter 
Grand Jury Case]. The Supreme Court has recognized an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to 
avoid compulsion to testify before a grand jury. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443–44 
(1972). However, this prohibition is not absolute. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 
U.S. 177, 189–90 (2004) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incrim-
inating . . . . Suspects who have been granted immunity from prosecution may, therefore, be com-
pelled to answer . . . .”).
102. Grand Jury Case, 786 F.3d at 261 n.1.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 
1989); United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934, 935 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971); see also Khanna, supra note 6, at 1518 (“[T]he 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial may, arguably, be available to corporate defendants.”).
104. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 412–17 (2008). 
105. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 474 (2010).
106. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 
GREEN BAG 2D 77, 82–84 (2010).
107. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Telling Stories of Shareholder Supremacy, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1049, 1075. But see GREENFIELD, supra note 93, at 67 (“The Second Amendment’s right to 
bear arms is described as a ‘right of the people,’ . . . [but the] First Amendment, for example, says 
that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’ without limitation of such 
right to persons.”).
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realm of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, the humaniza-
tion of corporations implied in Citizens United may necessitate greater judicial 
review to meet the fairness standards that courts operate under for human de-
fendants.108 Citizens United’s blending of the corporate form and personhood 
may strengthen the rationale for prosecuting a corporation directly when in the 
past it would have made more sense to prosecute individuals responsible for the 
misconduct.109
Citizens United represents a major step in the slow jurisprudential march 
towards corporations claiming rights previously reserved for individuals.  But it 
raises the question: if corporations can reap the benefits of constitutional enti-
tlements for individuals, should they not too face the consequences for miscon-
duct that individuals experience?  Legislators have ample room for creativity in 
crafting proactive policy measures to constrain and deter corporate malfeasance 
in the face of these growing rights.
A corporate analogue to individual felony disenfranchisement is an active 
step that legislators could take against the growing trend allowing corporations 
“to take advantage of the significant benefits of the corporate form . . . without 
having to shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities.”110 The implementa-
tion of limits on electioneering as a collateral consequence of a corporation’s 
criminal conviction would add deterrent teeth to corporate prosecutions that do 
not exist today.  Because the Court has consistently recognized that corporate 
political speech can still be limited to prevent corruption,111 this tool could per-
missibly exist against a post-Citizens United backdrop.
III. CRAFTING A CORPORATE ANALOGUE TO 
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
A. Substance and Mechanics of Corporate Disenfranchisement
This Note proposes that corporations convicted of criminal conduct should 
suffer collateral consequences analogous to individual criminal disenfranchise-
ment.  Just as individual disenfranchisement strips the right to vote from an in-
dividual convicted of a felony,112 this reform would constrain the ability of a 
corporation to effect change in the electoral process following a criminal con-
viction.  The reform would therefore constitute a step towards similar treatment 
of individuals and corporations in the world of criminal prosecutions.
108. See Sheyn, supra note 98, at 39–41.
109. See Slobogin, supra note 106, at 78.
110. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1437 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Citizens United; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)).
111. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737 
(2008).
112. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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The core of the proposed reform would impose contribution limits on cor-
porations that have been convicted of a crime.  For this subset of corporations,
the reform would effectively reinstate the more generally applicable provision 
of McCain-Feingold that the Supreme Court invalidated in Citizens United.113
Another component of the reform would heighten the disclosure require-
ments imposed on contributions to SuperPACs by convicted corporations.  Re-
lying on Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous exhortation that sunlight provides the 
best disinfectant,114 these disclosure requirements would expose the concealed 
links between criminally convicted corporations and organizations purposed 
with influencing the electoral process.  Such disclosure requirements would 
provide a step towards making up for the gap in FEC-imposed disclosure re-
quirements that have exacerbated the influx of obfuscated corporate money into 
elections following the decision in Citizens United.115
Corporate criminal disenfranchisement would attach upon conviction at trial 
or upon the entry of a guilty plea.  It would last for a prescribed length of time 
as a condition of probation.  The policy could also come as a term of a corpora-
tion’s deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement.  The reform would 
be permissive, not mandatory, in nature, so as to target those corporate criminal 
defendants whom the policy would deter.116
Corporate disenfranchisement would also be limited to a subset of prosecu-
tions for criminal acts that engender corruption within the electoral system.  The 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that corporate electoral speech can 
be limited in furtherance of anticorruption.117 Therefore, limiting the policy to 
corporate crimes of this sort ensures that this punishment appropriately fits its 
crime—that is, the policy represents a refined tool, not a blunt hammer.
B. Benefits of Corporate Criminal Disenfranchisement
Corporate criminal disenfranchisement would advance several goals of the 
criminal justice system.  First, the proposed reform would impose new collateral 
consequences for a subset of corporate crimes, thereby responding to critiques 
of corporate criminal prosecutions as lacking in real deterrence.  Corporations 
would care about the potential effects of disenfranchisement and would change 
113. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355–56 (2010).
114. Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913 at 10.
115. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 80, at 936–37.
116. A significant share of corporate criminal prosecutions targets small businesses. See
Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, supra note 26, at 1326 n.193. 
Therefore, to the degree that small businesses are less likely to engage in electioneering than large 
corporations, this could limit the proper application of the proposed reform to a relatively modest 
number of cases. Nonetheless, the reform is a worthwhile pursuit both because of the deterrent mes-
sage sent to all corporations, along with its effect of bolstering the popular perception of fairness in 
criminal corporate prosecutions.
117. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 
737 (2008).
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their behavior as a result.  Second, corporate disenfranchisement would strike a 
tone of fairness throughout the broader criminal justice system.  As corporations 
have claimed more and more rights previously reserved for individuals, corpo-
rate disenfranchisement levels the playing field at least somewhat by imposing 
upon corporations a collateral consequence analogous to restrictions that society 
places upon convicted criminals’ ability to vote.
Commentators have called into question the true deterrent force of corporate 
prosecutions.118 Corporations cannot be jailed.  Likewise, the stigmatic harm of 
a criminal conviction may be less for corporations than for individuals because 
their focus is on their financial bottom line.  Some argue that, as a result, corpo-
rations care far more about the fines that flow from a criminal conviction than 
about the conviction itself.119
Introducing a novel collateral consequence to a corporation’s criminal con-
viction would change this calculus.  Corporations that regularly engage in elec-
tioneering would experience greater deterrence from corporate disenfranchise-
ment than they do under the current criminal justice regime.  For instance, one 
of the largest monetary penalties ever included in a corporate plea agreement 
involved the Koch Petroleum Group.120 The company is a subsidiary of Koch 
Industries, which has a longstanding reputation as one of the most active corpo-
rate electioneering donors in the United States.121 Corporate criminal disen-
franchisement following its conviction could have dampened Koch’s subse-
quent electoral influence.
One might question whether corporate disenfranchisement would apprecia-
bly alter corporations’ behavior.  After all, the limitations do not fall on the in-
dividuals that make up the corporation.  In theory, members of the corporation 
could circumvent the reach of the proposed reform by simply forming a new 
entity and carrying on unaffected.  However, such an endeavor would take time, 
resources, and effort.  Corporate disenfranchisement does not need to be entire-
ly airtight and inescapable to drive behavior.  If the reach of the policy can be 
avoided, but only through inconvenient or costly means, it nonetheless has the 
power to shift behavior.
118. See discussion supra Part I.A.
119. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1500 (noting that some corporations may be unbothered by 
reputational harms of criminal liability). A helpful illustration comes from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission rules informally known as the “Bad Boy” provisions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) 
(2013). These provisions disqualify those convicted of a criminal securities violation from use of 
certain capital accumulation safe harbors. Presumably, this adds deterrent effect to criminal liability 
beyond mere stigmatic harm: corporations are better incentivized to avoid criminal violations of 
securities laws when it could impact their future ability to raise capital.
120. Koch Pleads Guilty to Covering Up Environmental Violations at Texas Oil Refinery,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENV’T AND NAT. RES. DIV. (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/
opa/pr/2001/April/153enrd.htm.
121. See Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par 
With Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/
us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html.
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Although one might anticipate strong corporate opposition to this reform, 
there is reason to believe that some corporations would, in fact, support it.  The 
notion of corporate “hands-tying” rests on the idea that some corporations pri-
vately prefer not to engage in certain activities, yet nonetheless feel compelled 
to participate.122 Several rationales explain this desire to assimilate (e.g., gain-
ing political capital, maintaining client relations, or building a specific public 
image)—rationales that are just as compelling in the context of corporate elec-
tioneering. But if corporations could point to law eliminating or limiting their 
discretion to do so, it provides cover for the corporation to pursue the course of 
conduct it would have preferred in the first place.123
Corporate criminal disenfranchisement would also send an important mes-
sage about the criminal justice system that corporations must play by the same 
rules as individuals.  The outrage aimed at the lack of criminal prosecutions in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis illustrated a popular perception that corpo-
rations operate with a degree of legal impunity unavailable to individuals.124
Corporations’ increasing zeal for claiming rights traditionally reserved for indi-
viduals strikes a similar tone of unfairness.125 Corporate disenfranchisement 
would send a clear message in response—if corporations want to lay claim to 
the benefits of personhood, they must accept this drawback of personhood in the 
criminal context.
C. Anticipating Constitutional Objections to 
Corporate Disenfranchisement
The First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech is a founda-
tional principle of American civil society.126 Accordingly, limits on speech 
must survive serious review.  And because this reform regulates political 
speech, it must adhere to the requirements of Buckley and Citizens United.127
The reform will have to advance both a compelling interest and be narrowly tai-
lored toward that goal.128 This is attainable. Properly tailored, corporate crimi-
nal disenfranchisement fits within the parameters of permissible regulations of 
political speech that the Supreme Court has set forth.
122. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1813 (1996) (discussing this phenomenon).
123. See id.; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publish-
ing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 628 (1992).
124. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 34.
125. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.
126. See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin, On Freedom of Speech and the Press, PA. GAZETTE, Nov. 
1737, at 9 (“Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government: when this support is taken 
away, the Constitution is dissolved and tyranny is erected on its ruins.”).
127. See McPhail, supra note 57.
128. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).
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Collateral consequences are a longstanding facet of our criminal justice sys-
tem.129 Individuals and corporations alike experience profound limitations on 
various rights and freedoms stemming from criminal convictions.130 Corpora-
tions in particular regularly face debarment when they have engaged in corrupt 
behavior.131 The right to contract, which debarment threatens to circumscribe, 
is certainly fundamental, but it is not unlimited.132
Collateral consequences of criminal convictions already entail a similar cir-
cumscription of constitutional rights.  For example, individuals convicted of a 
felony yield their Second Amendment right to possess firearms.133 Those con-
victed of a domestic violence offense are subject to some limitations on their 
First Amendment right to free speech in the form of no-contact court orders.134
Specifically in the arena of corporate expenditures for the purpose of fund-
ing electioneering efforts, the Supreme Court has long recognized that limita-
tions on corporate speech may survive searching First Amendment review 
where a governmental interest in reducing corruption drives those limitations.135
Stifling political speech as a means of preventing corruption or the appearance 
thereof remains constitutionally permissible even post-Citizens United.136
Criminal laws prohibiting graft, bribery, and the like do precisely this.137
129. See discussion supra Part I.B.
130. See discussion supra Part I.B. And, note that courts routinely view some constitutional 
rights as more protective of the interests of individuals than of corporations. See GREENFIELD, supra 
note 93, at 21 (pointing to courts’ treatment of forced corporate disclosure in securities law and in 
the law surrounding Freedom of Information Act requests, and arguing that laws demanding the 
same disclosures from individuals would violate the First Amendment); cf. id. at 135 (“Require-
ments that corporations disclose financial and other information material to those who engage with 
them, for example, should be unassailable even if such requirements might be constitutionally prob-
lematic if applied to natural persons.”). Since individual disenfranchisement is constitutionally per-
missible, perhaps courts would have little reason to frown upon analogous treatment of corpora-
tions.
131. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
132. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911) 
(“[F]reedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right.”).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (criminalizing the possession of firearms and ammunition for 
individuals “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (invalidating a District 
of Columbia statute banning handgun possession, but noting that “nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. Alabama, No. 14-0059-WS-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88245 (S.D. 
Ala. June 30, 2015); State v. Latham, Nos. A11-1930 and A11-1931, 2014 Minn. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1204 (Nov. 24, 2014); Thatcher v. Thatcher, No. 22493-7-III, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 
2361 (Oct. 19, 2004).
135. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985) 
(“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling 
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”).
136. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014).
137. See id. at 206–08 (discussing the types of quid pro quo corruption where prevention of 
which may be a permissible basis for limiting speech); see also Dave Denison, Zephyr Teachout: 
We’re Mired in Corruption, BAFFLER (Jan. 27, 2017), https://thebaffler.com/latest/zephyr-teachout-
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Therefore, imposing corporate disenfranchisement upon a company that has 
broken these types of laws falls squarely within the permissible regulation of 
speech that the Court has long allowed.
In one key passage of its opinion, the Citizens United Court is quick to 
equate “citizens” and “associations of citizens” for the purpose of First 
Amendment analysis.138 The court leans on this logic to equate protection of 
the rights of individual speech with protection of the rights of corporate 
speech.139 Implicit in this analogue is the function of the corporate governance 
structure as a mechanism of translation for individual speech: when corpora-
tions speak, they are simply manifesting the speech of their individual members.  
However, in the context of corporate crime, this logic breaks down.  If the cor-
poration’s system of governance has allowed for or facilitated the commission 
of a crime, perhaps that structure has crucial flaws.  If that is the case, then 
equating a corporation’s speech to an amalgamation or translation of its mem-
bers’ speech is illogical, and the need for robust First Amendment protections is 
less apparent.
Even if the forcible imposition of corporate disenfranchisement upon con-
viction were to run afoul of the First Amendment, the same result could perhaps 
permissibly emerge through plea bargains, deferred-prosecution agreements, 
and non-prosecution agreements.  The consensual nature of these agreements 
could avoid some constitutional hurdles.  However, given the significant criti-
cism of deferred- and non-prosecution agreements, this technique is not ideal.140
Concerns of coercion that exist around these agreements would be even greater 
when First Amendment protections are implicated.141
CONCLUSION
Citizens United changed the face of corporate citizenship.  Conceptions of 
corporate personhood following the decision have extended well beyond the 
realm of political speech and election law.  The possibility that this extension 
may soon reach the world of corporate criminal prosecutions cannot be ignored.  
Accordingly, if corporations continue the trend of claiming individual rights, 
corruption-denison (“[T]he way in which [the framers of the Constitution] would use the word bribe 
is somewhat different than you might use the word bribe now. Bribery did not typically in their 
conversation refer to a particular criminal law statute. . . . What they meant was taking money for 
influence.”).
138. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment has any 
force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply 
engaging in political speech.”).
139. Id.
140. For examples of such criticism, see generally Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra 
note 7; Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, supra note 26.
141. See, e.g., Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, supra note 
26, at 1342.
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they should also be subject to the drawbacks individuals face in claiming those 
rights.
The decision seems to be here to stay.  Still, policymakers can take Citizens 
United as an opportunity to devise creative new incentives for corporate behav-
ior, rather than treat it as the tombstone of all corporate regulation.  Corporate 
disenfranchisement presents such a policy measure that alleviates election law 
shortfalls in the wake of Citizens United, bolsters fairness in the criminal justice 
system, and steers corporate behavior in a positive direction.
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